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Are There Moral Limits to!Wage 
Inequality?
Kory!P.!Schaff
Income inequality in democratic societies with market economies is size-
able and growing. One reason for this growth can be traced to unequal 
forms of compensation that employers pay their workers. !e most com-
mon form is wages per hour or salary per" annum, but increasingly 
bonuses, pro#t sharing, and stock options are common forms of compen-
sation as well. !e gap between top and bottom earners has widened over 
the last three decades as a result. !e top 10% earners have on average 10 
times more income than the bottom 90%, the top 1% make 39 times 
more, and the top 0.01% earn a stunning 188 times more (Saez 2019). 
Looking strictly at wage inequality, the paychecks of top earners grew 
exponentially from 1979 to 2017, while the bottom 90% saw a rather 
meager growth of 22% despite an increase in productivity of 138% in the 
same period (Mishel and Kassa 2019). A key driver of this growing 
inequality has been executive compensation. For example, the 
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CEO-to-worker pay gap was nine times larger in 2017 than 1980, while 
the average CEO was paid $13.94"million compared to just $38,613 for 
average workers (Anderson and Pizzigati 2019). Based on these data, it 
appears the labor power of a small minority of top earners is increasingly 
more valuable than everyone else combined.
One way that democratic societies have tackled this problem is to 
enforce a standard for wages that all workers are paid regardless of educa-
tion, skills, or contribution. !e aim of this policy is to regulate labor 
markets so that workers receive a minimum amount of compensation. 
!ere is also a growing movement to establish a “living wage” that is suf-
#cient for workers to cover basic needs such as food, housing, and health 
care. Even with this standard in place, however, wage inequality would 
still exist because it places no caps on the wages of more educated and 
skilled workers. Perhaps this standard might constrain the growth of 
inequality, but it will not by itself reduce inequality. !is raises a novel 
question: Should there be equal pay for all workers? To answer this ques-
tion, we need to investigate some of the factors that are relevant to the 
conditions in which wage o$ers are made. By clarifying these factors, we 
can determine whether wage inequality is morally permissible. If it is not, 
then a case might be made to pay all workers the same wages regardless of 
their education, skills, or contribution. Even if we conclude it is permis-
sible, another question worth considering here is whether there are limits 
to how much inequality is acceptable.
!e argument proceeds along the following lines. To begin, I summa-
rize the economic and non-economic factors that determine the value of 
wages in labor markets. !is will help us understand the causes of wage 
inequality and why it tends to be an inevitable outcome of market trans-
actions between employers and workers. Next, I examine a particular 
moral problem that concerns labor markets and the unequal conditions 
of power and authority in which wage o$ers are made. !e issue is 
whether o$ers made under these conditions are coercive because they 
restrict alternatives or otherwise include threats to the welfare of workers. 
If there are doubts about whether these unequal conditions can ensure 
that o$ers are voluntary all things considered, then we have good reasons 
to establish a wage standard that improves them so they are more volun-
tary. Finally, I claim that establishing this standard will require increasing 
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the value of low-wage work. Doing so will not only expand the alterna-
tives that are available to these workers, it will also diminish the potential 
threat to their welfare. !ere are two arguments for improving the condi-
tions of employment along these lines. !e #rst entails a critical inspec-
tion of the “compensatory” value of low-wage work. Paying workers 
lower wages tends to be justi#ed by claiming their labor contributes less 
in terms of output, but there are many features of such work that are 
unsatisfactory and unhealthy. Since these features are endemic and 
adversely a$ect the welfare of workers, there are reasonable grounds for 
increasing the compensatory value of wages for these kinds of jobs. !e 
second argument is that some wage inequality is permissible, but there are 
moral limits to how much we ought to accept. !ese limits can be estab-
lished by a living wage that aims to ensure all workers, especially those in 
low-wage jobs, can achieve a su%cient standard of living that is consis-
tent with democratic values.
 Wage Inequality in!Labor Markets
In market economies the price of a commodity is determined by three 
factors: the cost of materials to produce it, supply, and relative demand 
for its consumption. Given that labor is also a commodity, economists 
measure the value of wages according to supply and demand, skills and 
education, and marginal contribution to the product of labor. So skilled 
workers who are in short supply and high demand will be able to claim 
higher wages than less skilled workers in great supply and low demand. 
Since wage inequality is measured by the di$erence in size of paychecks, 
wages and salaries will be treated here as equivalents.
First, the price of wages is determined by intersecting curves of supply 
and demand where the quantity of labor demanded is equal to the quan-
tity of labor supplied. !ere are many factors that a$ect the supply and 
demand of labor of course, but all such changes merely shift the direction 
of the curve one way or the other depending on the circumstances of 
change. When there is little demand for roo#ng contractors in a region 
with severe winters, there will be a low supply of workers looking for 
roo#ng jobs in those months. Once the weather improves, the curve will 
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shift as demand for roo#ng jobs rises. In addition, there are “contribu-
tory” and “compensatory” factors that determine the value of wages. !e 
former is the value that workers contribute to the production of goods and 
services with the performance of their skills, while the latter is just com-
pensation that includes costs they incur from this performance. For these 
reasons, skilled workers command higher wages because the contribution 
of their performance signi#cantly adds to the value of products or ser-
vices that requires the use of such skills. Moreover, acquisition of these 
skills typically requires more education and training, as well as a signi#-
cant amount of time that it takes to pursue a degree or become pro#cient 
with advanced skills, so the compensatory part of their wages tends to be 
greater as well. Less skilled workers supposedly add less value and incur 
lower costs with their performance, so the value of their wages tends to be 
lower for both parts as well. Finally, the development of social capital in 
terms of education and specialized skills also determines the value of 
wages because acquiring these can be time consuming and costly. So 
wages tend to rise with the level of education and training workers bring 
with them to labor markets or they acquire from job experience.
In addition, the value of wages is determined by other factors that are 
not relevant to the performance of the skills required for the job. Such 
non-economic, or non-wage, factors as they are sometimes called, may 
include bene#ts, prestige and geography, all of which e$ect changes in 
the curve of supply and demand. Consider so-called “dirty work” such as 
sanitation regarding these non-economic factors. Jobs that have working 
conditions considered debasing or hazardous tend to compensate work-
ers more than would be necessary in the absence of such conditions. 
Working in sanitation is not only “dirty”, it is also dangerous, so wages 
for these jobs are greater than the performance of those skills contributes 
to output (Walzer 1983, pp."175–176). !ere are other non-wage factors 
that are more insidious and have an impact on the value of wages as well. 
For example, irrational preferences may cause changes in the price of 
wages, ranging from benign reactions concerning a potential employee’s 
character during an interview to unjust forms of discrimination based on 
gender or race. We shall return to examine this part of wage valuation 
more critically in the third section.
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Given that the value of wages is determined by all these factors (and 
more), it is apparent why wage inequality is an inevitable outcome of 
markets in labor. Economists for the most part do not claim that such 
inequality is wrong, though they do claim there is a bene#t. !e price of 
wages acts as a signal to coordinate both individual behavior and social 
cooperation. So good-paying jobs that require special skills can provide 
individuals with incentives to acquire those skills through education or 
training in order to demand higher wages for their labor. In this respect, 
wage inequality is supposed to act as an incentive for individuals to 
develop their social capital. !is is bene#cial to individuals because it 
helps them realize their preferred skills and improves their welfare, and it 
can bene#t the economy as a whole by spurring innovation and promot-
ing growth.
 Freedom, Coercion, and!Wage Offers
!ere is currently no consensus among philosophers whether there is any 
single objective standard for determining what is right or good. !ere is 
signi#cant disagreement whether acting according to self-interest, virtue, 
duty, or consequences o$ers the appropriate standard for evaluating our 
intentions and actions. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the purpose 
of ethical theory in general is to guide our actions on the basis of rational 
principles. So di$erent normative claims can be made about work in this 
regard. By way of example, consider ethical egoism. As a theory, it pur-
ports to show that individuals should act on their self-interest because 
doing so is mutually advantageous and encourages the e%cient allocation 
of resources (Rachels 2003, p."83). Based on this principle, wage inequal-
ity would be especially permissible because it is bene#cial to market econ-
omies. A di$erent line of argument might be taken by virtue theory, 
however. Living a “good life” requires having the traits of a good charac-
ter that are acquired through re&ection and habit (Rachels 2003, p."173). 
On this view, gainful employment can promote a variety of such traits. 
!e slogan “an honest day’s wage for an honest day’s work” re&ects the 
idea that working diligently promotes self-su%ciency and cultivates hon-
esty, reliability, and punctuality.
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!e point here is not that any particular theory is the right one for 
answering the question whether wage inequality should be permitted. 
Although most economists claim that markets are morally “neutral” in 
some sense of the term, there are many places where morality and mar-
kets do intersect. Even though the models found in positive economics 
aim to describe and predict what happens in market economies under 
various conditions, the reality is that markets are actually determined by 
human behavior and decision-making. For this reason, there are always 
concerns about the ways in which human behavior and choices in real 
market conditions can a$ect our morally relevant interests. In the case of 
wage inequality, these interests are directly implicated because the satis-
faction of welfare depends on having su%cient wages. In addition, the 
welfare of individuals is interdependent in markets, such that enforcing 
wage standards can improve the welfare of all. Conversely, the failure to 
enforce standards can diminish welfare. “Allowing some people to work 
for whatever salary (e.g. having no minimum wage) a$ects the wages that 
other people are able to command” (Hausman et"al. 2017, p."100). Since 
wages do have a direct e$ect on the satisfaction of welfare, we have com-
pelling reasons to consider whether there are moral problems with this 
form of compensation and how these ought to be addressed.
One longstanding concern about modern work focuses on its relation-
ship to freedom. Most of us take for granted that employment is volun-
tary, so questions about whether there is a moral problem with it rarely, 
if ever, arise. Given that sellers of their own labor-power are free to accept 
or reject the terms of employment, it appears that this relationship 
respects the value of freedom. !e voluntariness of this relationship, how-
ever, depends on a variety of conditions that may include factors that 
limit or subvert freedom. First, there are vastly unequal relations of power 
and authority within the relationship between employers and workers. 
!ese inequities weaken the bargaining power of the latter from the out-
set. Workers are at a disadvantage because they need work to satisfy their 
welfare (and that of their dependents), while employers are free to choose 
from many candidates for the job. Second, there are social and political 
forces beyond the scope of this relationship proper that also have on out-
size in&uence on hiring, promotions, and compensation. Consider the 
legacy of racism and its e$ects on hiring in employment. Research shows 
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that racial biases can determine whether job candidates are selected for 
interviews on the basis of stereotyping about their names during the 
application process (Levitt and Dubner 2005, p."188). !e fact that such 
factors do in&uence the conditions of the employment relationship does 
raise doubts that it is exclusively voluntary, at least in the sense that the 
value of freedom is realized equally and e$ectively for all parties concerned.
We can begin by asking whether the conditions in which wage o$ers 
take place are su%ciently equalized, so that no one is disadvantaged or 
limited in their freedom. Many philosophers claim this cannot be the 
case with wage labor because there are unequal relations of power and 
authority between employers and workers from the start. For example, 
part of Marx’s critique of capitalism is that wage labor “is not voluntary, 
but coerced, forced labor” (Marx 1994, p."62). He claims there are signi#-
cant political di$erences between the modes of production found in slav-
ery, serfdom and wage labor, but coercion still remains in what otherwise 
appear to be voluntary transactions in labor markets. !is is due to the 
structure of property relations found in capitalism where a small class of 
owners maintains control over the means of production, while a large 
class of producers must sell their labor to them in order to satisfy their 
welfare. In the employment relationship, the latter start out from the 
disadvantage of necessity. !ey are compelled to work for the former since 
the alternative of unemployment remains a perpetual threat to their wel-
fare. Marx’s claim is that workers are forced to accept the wages that 
employers o$er, or risk an alternative that makes them worse o$. 
!erefore, unequal relations of power and authority confer an obvious 
advantage on employers that undermine the conditions of voluntariness 
for workers.
!e concern that various kinds of inequalities can lead to coercion is 
also the topic of a recent debate. In a classic paper, Robert Nozick claims 
that “coercion” must meet certain conditions in order to be accurately 
described as such (Nozick 1969). He claims that a proposal between P 
and Q is coercive if and only if it includes a threat so that accepting other 
alternatives will make Q worse o$ than if the latter were to accept the 
proposal. Nozick’s conception is narrow in the sense that the threat must 
be e$ective and the proposal accepted in order for a transaction to be 
coercive. !ere can be no potential coercion in his view, because it only 
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takes place when the threat is su%cient to compel the desired outcome. 
Q would be free to accept or reject P’s o$er in the absence of a threat. 
!ere is no such thing as coercive o!ers, then, because there are usually no 
threats involved in making o$ers.
Nozick’s de#nition of coercion here is too restrictive. It seems at odds 
with our ordinary judgment that proposals can be coercive without nec-
essarily achieving the outcome that is demanded by a threat. Let us con-
sider the possibility of coercion in employment relations without 
dehumanizing the respective parties as variables in an equation. Instead 
of P and Q, suppose Sherri makes a proposal to Terri that relies on a 
threat to compel the latter to do her bidding. Sherri claims that either 
Terri does her work for her, or she will tell their supervisor that she is not 
doing her own work. In this situation, we do not normally conclude that 
Sherri’s attempt to coerce Terri is unproblematic as long as it is does not 
work. !e former’s actions are plainly wrong because it is pernicious to 
use coercion as a method to get the latter to do her bidding. What this 
example shows is that threats are morally impermissible whether they are 
successful or not.
Now let us return to the question whether wage o$ers are coercive 
because they depend on threats. We typically think of o$ers and threats 
as entirely di$erent sorts of proposals. O$ers are accepted or rejected 
without consequences, while a threat aims to compel a particular choice 
with the force of its consequences. So what, if any, threat is there in mak-
ing a wage o$er? !e political philosopher Hillel Steiner #rst used the 
notion of a “thro$er” to talk about the ways in which o$ers may include 
threats that are implicit or indirect (Steiner 1974–1975). With respect to 
wage labor, the implicit threat appears to be that workers will be worse o$ 
if they do not accept an o$er. In response to Nozick’s conclusion, David 
Zimmerman claims that wage o$ers in capitalism are coercive because: 
“(1) an alternative pre-proposal situation workers would strongly prefer 
to the actual one is technologically and economically feasible when the 
o$er is made, and (2) workers are prevented from having at least one of 
these feasible alternative pre-proposal situations” (Zimmerman 1981, 
pp."144–145). In this way, wage o$ers restrict the freedom of workers 
when there are feasible alternatives and they are prevented from opting 
for at least one of these. !ere can be no doubt that all workers prefer a 
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pre-proposal situation where they enjoy better wages and working condi-
tions. Yet they are prevented from these by the limited choice they are 
faced with whether to accept an o$er or reject it. Where is the threat here?
Suppose Rod o$ers Todd a low-wage and menial job. On Zimmerman’s 
view, the o$er will be coercive if there are alternatives that Todd would 
prefer that are feasible at the time and he is prevented from opting for at 
least one of these. Clearly, he prefers a meaningful job that pays more. 
!e fact that this alternative is not available to him is determined, in part, 
by the structure of property relations found in capitalism and the contin-
gency of labor markets entailed by it. If Todd is prevented from opting 
for better employment conditions in this respect, it does not necessarily 
arise from a threat. Perhaps there is “social forcing” happening here inso-
far as he is prevented from selecting that alternative or it is altogether 
suppressed from consideration (Ezorsky 2007, pp."16–17). !ere is also 
a threat that he will be worse o$, however, if he does not accept Rod’s 
o$er. What makes Todd “worse o$” precisely? Without having gainful 
employment, he cannot satisfy his own welfare (or that of his depen-
dents), so the threat lies in rejecting the o$er. !e choice Todd has to 
accept or reject it entails very di$erent outcomes. !e di$erence is 
between not having an option one might prefer to begin with, versus fac-
ing an option that is not preferable at all. For example, Todd may not have 
the option of joining a union that will ensure higher wages because he 
lives in a “right-to-work” state. While that certainly limits his freedom to 
choose a preferred alternative, it is not on the basis of what we typically 
call a threat. If Todd rejects the o$er though, he will almost certainly be 
worse o$ for not having a job. So there is a “threat” implicit in the condi-
tions in which this o$er is made. While he may be formally free to reject 
the o$er, it will likely come at a cost to Todd’s welfare (and also that of his 
dependents). !e threat need not be made explicit by Rod because it is, 
in e$ect, always already part of the conditions in which wage o$ers are 
made to workers.
!ere is a standard objection to the argument here that wage o$ers can 
be coercive, which appeals to a formal conception of freedom. !e claim 
is made that workers are always free to make a choice whether they are 
made worse o$ by one or more of the alternatives. Consider an o$er that 
Crazy makes to Lazy for little compensation in an unrewarding job (Van 
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Parijs 1991). As an employer, the former estimates the value of this work 
based on the marginal product of labor whereby adding the latter as an 
additional unit of labor will increase output. So Crazy makes an o$er that 
is determined on the basis that Lazy’s contribution is likely to be consis-
tent with his namesake. In short, limited contribution justi#es meager 
wages. Lazy accepts the o$er despite the pay and unattractive qualities of 
the job. Surely, he will be better o$ than he would be without the job 
(assuming he is unemployed, or has a job that pays even less). Since Lazy 
is just as free either to reject or to accept the o$er, his choice appears to 
be entirely voluntary. !is conception of freedom holds the view that all 
choices may present limits, but none of these limits compel Lazy to make 
any particular choice one way or the other. !erefore, Crazy’s wage o$er 
cannot be coercive in any meaningful sense of that term. Whether Lazy 
has at least one other opportunity here, or whether he can get better 
wages for it, is irrelevant to his ability to make a choice based on the 
options before him.
Nevertheless, what this formal conception of freedom fails to appreci-
ate is that unequal relations of power and authority do have signi#cant 
in&uence over the employment choices that we make (Anderson 2017, 
pp."41–42). !e claim that all wage o$ers are voluntary ignores consider-
ations about whether the right conditions are in place for freedom to be 
realized equitably. Todd’s dilemma reveals that the choices and welfare of 
workers are restricted or threatened, especially in less regulated labor mar-
kets where wage o$ers are made. Like everyone, he prefers higher wages 
and more satisfying work. To the extent his preferred alternatives are 
restricted by such conditions, he is less free than he might otherwise be. 
!ere is also an implicit threat hovering in the background of Rod’s o$er 
as well. If Todd rejects the o$er, the alternative of unemployment surely 
poses a real risk to his welfare. Perhaps the choice confronting him is a 
choice, but he is still compelled to take the job in order to satisfy his 
needs. In e$ect, he is forced to accept the o$er because he is threatened 
with a reduction of his welfare.
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 Moral Limits to!Wage Inequality
If we accept that freedom is valuable to everyone, then democratic societ-
ies have an obligation to create and ensure conditions that practically 
realize it for all workers, no matter their education, skills, or contribu-
tion. In practice, this means that they should have the option of rejecting 
employment that is excessively restrictive without threats to their welfare 
looming over their choices. Are there any means available for improving 
these conditions in democratic societies? Consideration of this question 
must begin with the recognition that unequal relations of power and 
authority in employment are not inevitable. !ey can be altered to 
improve the choices of workers while diminishing the coercive aspects of 
wage o$ers. Whether we #nd Rod’s o$er morally permissible, therefore, 
depends on whether those factors that restrict Todd’s options or threaten 
him with a worse alternative can be changed for the better.
One radical approach was suggested at the outset: to pay everyone the 
same regardless of education, skills, or contribution. !is would certainly 
have the e$ect of immediately equalizing power and authority in employ-
ment relations by eliminating wage inequality altogether. However, the 
e$ects of this approach would appear to be mixed at best. While a policy 
of “equal pay for all” could expand alternatives and diminish threats to 
welfare for less skilled workers, it might also diminish opportunities for 
skilled workers and reduce demand for improving social capital in terms 
of education and training. Perhaps there is a less disruptive way of expand-
ing choices, minimizing threats to welfare, and realizing freedom more 
equitably. Does the achievement of these goals require paying all workers 
the same wages? Or can employment conditions be improved for all 
without enforcing equal compensation?
I shall now consider two arguments for improving the conditions of 
work by establishing a standard that is su"cient for all workers to achieve 
a decent level of welfare. First, a critical inspection of the compensatory 
value of wages reveals there are some factors associated with low-wage 
work that justify increasing its value on this basis. !ere are many non- 
economic factors that can a$ect the value of wages, and these range 
widely from weather to occupational safety. As discussed earlier, weather 
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a$ects the price of wages for roo#ng contractors because the supply and 
demand curve shifts signi#cantly in regions with extreme seasons. One 
might claim that weather is a material fact that we cannot control. While 
that may be true, there are other relevant factors of compensation a$ect-
ing wages that can be altered. We can look to the example of sanitation 
work again, which has higher rates of compensation in order to attract 
and keep workers. !ese jobs are inherently debasing and dangerous, 
even though they can be made safer by establishing rules, investing in 
training, and cultivating workplace culture. Dangerous workplaces that 
take safety and training seriously, then, can be more productive and have 
less down time due to injuries. Since making these kinds of changes can 
positively a$ect the value of wages, a case can be made for altering other 
such factors as well.
Consider several of the negative factors endemic to low-wage work. 
!ese jobs are typically unsatisfactory because of meager compensation, 
restricted autonomy, limited opportunities for advancement, and inse-
cure employment. !ey also tend to lead to unhealthy outcomes for 
workers who are trapped in them. For example, a growing body of 
research shows that individuals in low-wage work su$er serious health 
e$ects including higher rates of disease and even decreased life expec-
tancy (Chetty et" al. 2016). None of these factors are immutable and 
therefore can be changed for the better. So we have reasonable grounds 
for improving them by increasing the compensation value of low-wage 
work, despite the limited contribution that workers in such jobs suppos-
edly make.
Second, a living wage can ensure that all workers have an income that 
is su%cient to attain a decent standard of living consistent with demo-
cratic values. Enforcing this standard also establishes limits for how much 
wage inequality is acceptable. From the moral point of view, all persons 
have an equal worth that obligates others to respect and ful#ll their rele-
vant interests. !ese interests include access to subsistence, security, self- 
respect, and community. In principle, a minimum wage standard should 
aim to secure and protect these interests as well. Yet the concept of “mini-
mum” has historically been disconnected from the actual costs associated 
with a decent standard of living in many democratic societies with mar-
ket economies. By emphasizing the concept of “living” in establishing a 
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wage standard, advocates have rightly drawn attention to the fact that 
there is a baseline that must be respected. !is baseline is determined by 
the cost of basic needs for clean water, nutrition, housing, and health 
care. No one can survive, let alone &ourish, without having their needs 
satis#ed at this level, so everyone has a morally relevant interest in ensur-
ing they have access to resources for ful#lling them. Since paid employ-
ment in labor markets is the fulcrum on which this access pivots, the 
value of wages for all workers should be determined by what it costs to 
ensure that a decent standard of living is equitably distributed. !e pur-
pose of a living wage is to set this standard high enough so that workers 
can satisfy their needs, but also have more choices with respect to employ-
ment and less worry that rejecting any job o$er is a risk to their welfare.
As a practical matter, recognizing that many jobs are unsatisfactory, 
unhealthy or both, and establishing a wage standard to improve these 
factors, can strengthen the relative position of all workers. !e e$ect of 
this policy will not only expand choices but also reduce the coercive 
aspects of wage o$ers. !e question whether wage inequality is morally 
permissible, then, turns out to be one that is not based on an “either/or” 
binary, but on a spectrum wherein those relevant conditions can be 
altered to enhance the prospects of freedom for all. If wage o$ers are 
acceptable insofar as we set a standard to improve the conditions under 
which they are made, then some wage inequality will be permissible as 
long as those standards are met for everyone. So paying workers di$er-
ently for di$erent kinds of work is not intrinsically wrong.
In this respect, the proposal of “equal pay for all” shoots past the mark 
so to speak. !e problem it aims to correct is that many workers are worse 
o$ in labor markets where they are forced to accept o$ers under condi-
tions of seriously unequal relations of power and authority. As a result, 
their choices are restricted and welfare threatened given the choices that 
they do have. While enforcing a standard of equal compensation might 
appear to resolve this problem, its e$ects would likely undermine it as a 
solution. !ese e$ects include limiting the capacity of markets in labor to 
allocate resources e%ciently, as well as eroding incentives for workers to 
improve social capital. Although such a policy might be incompatible 
with market economies, its intention to correct the problem of inequality 
is appropriate. !ere is an intermediary step that can be made, however, 
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to constrain the problem of unequal relations of power and authority 
between employers and workers. By establishing a living wage standard 
instead, the unrestricted conditions of wage inequality can be improved 
in ways that expand choices for workers and minimize the coercive aspects 
of wage o$ers. !us, freedom can be practically realized not just for the 
increasingly well-o$ few, but also for the growing many who are less 
well o$.
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